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THE POWER OF STATE LEGISLATURES TO 
SUBPOENA FEDERAL OFFICIALS 
MICHAEL VITIELLO* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Within the federal system, state legislatures and state 
courts retain broad powers respectively to legislate and to adju-
dicate. • A congressional enactment may preempt a particular 
subject matter for legislation,2 or Congress may create exclusive 
federal court jurisdiction.8 Absent congressional intent to with-
draw a subject matter from the state system, state legislatures 
and courts share concurrent authority with Congress and the 
federal courts. In those areas, at least in theory, federal and 
state authorities are considered fungible.' For example, in Stone 
v. Powell5 the Court based its refusal to extend the exclusionary 
rule to federal habeas corpus proceedings in part on an assump-
tion that state courts were "functionally interchangeable forums 
• Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University School of Law; B.A. 1969, 
Swarthmore College; J.D. 1974, University of Pennsylvania. The author wishes to thank 
Jennifer James Ausenbaugh for her invaluable research assistance. This paper is based 
on research done pursuant to a grant from the Louisiana Legislature. 
1. U.S. CoNST. amend. X. 
2. See generally J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YouNG, HANDBOOK ON CoNSTITU· 
TJONAL LAW 267-70 (1978). 
3. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1338{a) (1976) (exclusive jurisdiction over patents, copy-
rights, and trade-marks); see also Clafin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 {1876); Miller v. 
Grandos, 529 F.2d 393 {5th Cir. 1976). 
4. See M. REDlSH, F'Bo&RAL JuRISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLocATION OF JUDICIAL 
PowER (1980): 
As noted previously, under traditionally accepted notions of federalism, 
state and federal courts have been considered largely fungible. Except in the 
comparatively rare instance where Congress has explicitly or by implication 
provided that jurisdiction is exclusively federal, state courts historically stand 
equal with their federal counterparts as enforcers of federal rigbta. 
IC state and federal courts are, in fact, interchangeable, there should be no 
question that whenever a federal court may regulate or control the actions of 
federal officers because their actions have transgressed statutory or constitu· 
tional limits, absent direct congressional prohibition state courts should have 
similar power. Those who believe in the current vitality of the traditional view 
generally reach this conclusion. 
/d. at 116 (footnotes omitted). 
5. 428 u.s. 465 {1976). 
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1983] SUBPOENA POWER 549 
likely to provide equivalent protection for federal constitutional 
rights."8 
Because of broad concurrent powers, state legislatures may 
frequently be aided by acquisition of information possessed by 
federal officials. The need for such information will become 
acute i{ President Reagan's "New Federalism" accomplishes its 
goal of shifting to the states programs currently administered by 
the federal government.7 The federal government can volunta-
rily relinquish such information,8 and state officials may be able 
to use federal courts to procure some information.9 The question 
discussed in this article is whether a state legislature may com-
pel attendance of federal officials by use of its subpoena power. 
The United States Supreme Court has never decided this 
question. There is only one federal district court decision on 
point. The district court in United States u. Owlett10 found that 
"complete immunity of a federal agency from state interference 
is well established" and that the Pennsylvania Legislature could 
not, therefore, subpoena federal officials. 11 The related question 
of state courts' power over federal officials has been the subject 
of more frequent adjudication.12 
After consideration of the general investigative powers of 
legislative bodies and the limitation posed by the Owlett deci-
sion, this article will examine the cases involving state court, as 
opposed to state legislative, power over federal officials to deter-
mine the extent to which those decisions prohibit a legislature 
from compelling federal officials to appear and to testify before 
it. It is the conclusion of this writer that the rationale for disal-
lowing state courts to summon federal officials does not apply 
with equal force to state legislatures-that is, that there is no 
justification for a complete prohibition against a state legisla-
6. Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1105 (1977). 
7. See, e.g., Isaacson, An Unhappy Anniversary: Amid Economic Woes, the Presi· 
dent Calls for a New Federalism, TIME, Feb. 1, 1982, at 12-14. 
8. See, e.g., Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1922). The holding in Ponzi 
has been codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4085 (1982). 
9. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982) (authoriz-
ing a federal district court to order the production of agency records improperly withheld 
from a complainant). 
10. 15 F. Supp. 736 (M.D. Pa. 1936). 
11. Jd. at 741. 
12. See infra notes 35-110 and accompanying text. 
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ture's summoning of federal officials. It is the recommendation 
of this writer that Congress enact a statute clarifying a state's 
right to subpoena federal officials if the subject matter is other-
wise within the legislature's competence. An alternative, though 
less certain, course would be for a state legislature to establish 
the same authority through litigation, up to the Supreme Court 
if necessary. 
II. THE LEGISLATIVE POWER To INVESTIGATE 
The power to investigate is necessary for a legislature to 
perform its function. Legislative investigation was well estab-
lished in England and the United States prior to the adoption of 
the Constitution.13 Contempt and subpoena powers to coerce un-
willing witnesses are necessary corollaries to that power.14 
In theory, the power to investigate is limited. The legisla-
ture can compel production of evidence only if it relates to a 
proper legislative function. 1° Further, a legislature must observe 
the constitutional rights guaranteed by the first amendment of 
the United States Constitution. 141 
In McGrain v. Dougherty, 17 a leading case on the limits of 
congressional investigations, the Court in dicta addressed the 
power of state legislatures. The Court cited with approval state 
court decisions upholding a legislature's implied authority "to 
obtain information needed in the rightful exercise of [the] power 
[to legislate]." 18 
Federal courts of appeal have also held that state legisla-
13. For a discussion of the history of legislative powers to investigate, see McGrain 
v. Dougherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161-74 (1927); Keele, Note on Congressional lnuestigations, 
40 A.B.A. J. 154 (1954), reprinted in LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 73-74 (C. Nut-
ting & R. Dickerson eds. 1978). 
14. See, e.g., 2 U .S.C. § 192 (1982) (making contempt of Congress a misdemeanor). 
15. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 253-54 (1970), re· 
printed in LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS: CASES AND MATERIALS 608 (0. Hetzel ed. 
1980). The legislature can force production of oral or documentary evidence only when 
the evidence relates to a proper function of the legislature, including the " primary one of 
enacting laws" and "such ancillary powers as judging the election of its members, expel-
ling or disciplining members, impeaching government officials, approving appointments, 
... and ... punishing those who would attempt to bribe its members." ld. at 253. 
16. ld. at 254. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959); Wat -
kins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197-98 (1957). 
17. 273 u.s. 135 (1927). 
18. Id. at 165. 
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tures can inquire into areas in which they have power to legis-
late so long as individual rights are not violated. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, for example, 
cautioned that "no federal court should enjoin a state legislative 
committee so long as it is acting within the scope of the author-
ity granted it by the legislature and its actions are not inter-
dicted by the Constitution of the United States."19 According to 
one commentator, "[t)he State legislatures are not confined by 
anything except the possibility of conflict with Federal power."20 
That is, whether a state legislature ought to be able to subpoena 
a federal official should be examined in light of the general rule 
that legislative power over witnesses and subject matter is 
broad. Public policy requires that power be broad because of the 
need for informed legislative decisions. 
III. STATE LEGISLATIVE POWER OVER FEDERAL OFFICIALS 
A question separate from recognized constitutional protec-
tions afforded to all individuals testifying before investigatory 
committees is whether federal officials are entitled to invoke a 
complete immunity from testifying before such bodies. The Su-
preme Court has never decided this question, and the only lower 
court case on point is United States v. Owlett.21 
In Owlett, the government sought an injunction to prevent a 
Pennsylvania legislative committee from investigating the Works 
Progress Administration (WPA) in that state. The committee 
subpoenaed WP A officials, but the district administrator issued 
a directive that "no officer or employee of the Works Progress 
Administration shall furnish any information or make available 
any official document or copy thereof to any person, except per-
sons having official business with the Works Progress 
Administration. " 22 
The district court granted the injunction because it found 
that investigation of federal agencies by state legislative commis-
sions "is an interference with the proper governmental function 
19. Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597, 605-06 (4th Cir. 1963), disapproved on 
other grounds, Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, 446 
U.S. 719, 732 n.lO (1980). 
20. T. EMERSON, supra note 15, at 254. 
21. 15 F. Supp. 736 (M.D. Pa. 1936). 
22. Id. at 740. 
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of the United States of America, [and that] complete immunity 
of a federal agency from state interference is well established. "23 
The attempt to investigate, concluded the court, amounted to 
"an invasion of the sovereign powers of the United States of 
America."2' In addition to theoretical concerns about sover-
eignty, the court was concerned about the pragmatic impact that 
state investigations might have on the operation level of the fed-
eral government: "The state having the power to subpoena may 
abuse that power by constantly and for long periods requiring 
federal employees and necessary federal records to be before an 
investigating committee. This power could embarrass, impede, 
and obstruct the administration of a federal agency."2G Further, 
the court reasoned from the Supreme Court's decision in Mc-
Grain v. Dougherty26 that the Pennsylvania Legislature ex-
ceeded its power when it set up a committee to investigate an 
area in which the legislature was powerless to act: "[T]he sub-
ject-matter of the investigation ... is a matter over which the 
[state] has no legislative power, and the information sought can-
not enable it to legislate on the subject of the investi-
gation .... "27 
Although not faced with the precise question raised in Owl-
ett, the Fifth Circuit relied on that decision in United States v. 
McLeod. 28 McLeod arose out of attempts by Dallas County, Ala-
bama officials to prevent the registration of black voters during 
the early 1960's. The United States sought to enjoin a state 
grand jury from investigating the Civil Rights Division of the 
Justice Department. The government alleged inter alia that the 
23. /d. at 741. In support of its view, the court cited Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 
459 (1900) (denying a state coUJ't power to subpoena records), Van Brocklin v. Tennes-
see, 117 U.S. 151 (1886) (denying a state court power to tax property of tht< United 
States within the state), Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879) (denying a state court 
power to criminally prosecute federal officials upon removal to federal court), and 
Buchanan v. Alexander, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 20 (1846) (denying a state court power to at-
tach unpaid wages of federal employees). 
24. 15 F. Supp. at 742. 
25. /d. 
26. 273 u.s. 135 (1927). 
27. 15 F. Supp. at 742. The court granted the requested injunction against the 
committee despite the availability of habeas corpus because a "court of equity will not 
subject the United States of America to a multiplicity of suits or compel federal officers 
and employees to incur the risk of fine and imprisonment to protect the United States of 
America from an illegal invasion of its sovereignty." /d. at 743. 
28. 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967). 
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intent of the county officials was to hamper the operation of the 
Civil Rights Division.29 The Fifth Circuit reversed the district 
court's denial of the injunction. 30 The court relied on Ow lett: 
"The interference of a state grand jury is just as intolerable as 
that of a state legislative committee."31 The court did, however, 
consider the defendant's contention that the investigation dealt 
with violations of state law, but rejected the claim as a "patent 
sham."32 Thus, the Fifth Circuit did not have to decide the more 
difficult question of whether a state legislative body could sub-
poena federal officials on matters within this limit of state au-
thority. The state contended that the federal attorneys should 
appear and assert a privilege against answering specific ques-
tions. But the court apparently rejected that view, in dictum, in 
favor of complete immunity found in Owlett: "[M]erely calling 
employees of the federal government before the grand jury 
would have the proscribed disruptive effect on the administra-
tion of a federal agency. "33 
As indicated, there is little case law defining the power of a 
state legislature to subpoena federal officials to testify or to pro-
duce documents. Owlett and the cases that have relied on it3' 
are based on three premises. First, while the state and federal 
governments are dual sovereigns, federal law is supreme in cer-
tain areas. It would, therefore, be antithetical to recognize the 
power of the state legislature to compel federal officials to attend 
legislative inquiries. Second, the operation of the federal govern-
ment can be obstructed if state legislatures are allowed to call 
federal officials away from their jobs, demand control of federal 
records, or incarcerate federal officials who fail to comply with 
legislative commands. Third, state legislative committees inves-
tigating federal agencies are acting without jurisdiction because 
the inquiry does not relate to a proper legislative function. 
Courts have relied on similar reasoning in cases involving 
the more frequently litigated issue of whether a state court may 
29. ld. at 738-39. 
30. ld. at 752. 
31. ld. 
32. ld. at 751. 
33. ld. at 752. 
34. See, e.g., id. at 751-52; Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. McGinnes, 179 F. 
Supp. 578, 582 (E.D. Pa. 1959), aff'd, 278 F.2d 330 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 820 
(1960). 
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coerce compliance of federal officials. Therefore, after a review 
of the case law in that context, it may be useful to examine the 
continued soundness of that reasoning. 
IV. STATE COURT POWER OVER FEDERAL OFFICIALS 
The power of state courts over federal officials has been liti-
gated frequently. The Supreme Court has not established a com-
plete immunity for federal officials; instead, an official's capacity 
to be sued depends on the relief sought by the plaintiff. Thus, 
federal courts have held that state courts may issue neither the 
writ of habeas corpus directing the release of a federal prisoneru 
nor the writ of mandamus to force a federal official to act. 36 Con-
versely, federal courts have allowed state courts to hear cases 
requesting damages against federal officials for acts done pursu-
ant to their official authority. 37 A litigant may also proceed in 
state court against a federal official in a case involving replevin38 
or ejectment.39 Less certain is whether a state court may enjoin a 
federal official. Without Supreme Court authority, lower courts 
have divided on that question. 40 
A. Habeas Corpus 
Prior to passage of the fugitive slave law in 1850,'1 it was 
generally assumed that state courts had the power to order the 
release of a federal detainee. 4 2 Slave owners pushed for the pas-
sage of the 1850 law to expedite the return of runaway slaves by 
35. Tarbles Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 
How.) 506 (1859). 
36. McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821). 
37. Teal v. Felton, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284 (1852). 
38. Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1 (1817). 
39. Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508 (1893). 
40. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Bruce, 298 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1962); Alabama ex rel. Gal-
lion v. Rogers, 187 F. Supp. 848 (M.D. Ala. 1960), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Dinkens v. 
Attorney General, 285 F.2d 430 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 913 (1961); Alabama v. 
Jones, 189 F. Supp. 61 (M.D. Ala. 1960); Pennsylvania Turnpike Conun'n v. McGinnes, 
179 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1959), aff'd per curiam, 278 F.2d 330 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
364 U.S. 820 (1960); Parry v. Delaney, 310 Mass. 107, 37 N.E.2d 249 (1941). But see 
Lewis Pub. Co. v. Wyman, 152 F. 200, 205 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1907). 
41. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (repealed 1864). 
42. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Downes, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 227 (1836); Common-
wealth v. Cushing, 11 Mass. 66 (1814); State v. Dimick, 12 N.H. 194 (1841); United 
States v. Wyngall, 5 Hill 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843); In re Carlton, 7 Cow. 471 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1827); In re Stacy, 10 Johns. 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813); In re Pleasa.nta, 11 Am. Ju. 
257 (Va. 1834). 
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increasing the number of federal officials empowered to issue a 
certificate of ownership and by making available federal mar-
shals to assist transportation of slaves back to the South. 43 
State court judges thwarted the act by issuing the writ of 
habeas corpus for the release of slaves within their jurisdiction. •• 
In turn, federal marshals acting in deference to federal law were 
incarcerated for refusing to obey state court orders. They then 
sought release by seeking the writ of habeas corpus in federal 
court. 411 
In 1859, the Supreme Court first addressed the power of 
state judges to issue the writ of habeas corpus in such cases in 
Able man u. Booth. 48 Able man involved a federal prisoner con-
victed for aiding in the escape of a slave. A Wisconsin Supreme 
Court judge ordered the prisoner's release from federal cus-
tody.•' The United States Supreme Court held that the state 
court was without jurisdiction: 
[A]lthough the State of Wisconsin is sovereign within its terri-
torial limits to a certain extent, yet that sovereignty is limited 
and restricted by the Constitution of the United States. And 
the powers of the General Government, and of the State, al-
though both exist and are exercised within the same territorial 
limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting sepa-
43. The Act of 1850 expanded a 1793 statute that gave slave owners the right to 
obtain a certificate of ownership of an escaped slave from a federal judge or state magis-
trate. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (repealed 1864). The owner was then au-
thorized to take the slave home. Since state magistrates rarely issued the certificates and 
the federal court system had few judges, the 1850 Act provided that commissioners of 
the federal circuit courts could issue the certificates and that federal marshals would be 
available to assist slave owners in the journey back to the South. 
44. See, e.g., In re Barrett, 42 Barb. 479 (N.Y. App. Div. 1863); In re Hopson, 40 
Barb. 34. (N.Y. App. Div. 1863); Reilly's Case, 2 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 334 (N.Y. 1867); In re 
Dobbs, 21 How. Pr. 68 (N.Y. 1861); Phelan's Case, 9 Abb. Pr. 286 (N.Y. 1859). See R. 
HURD, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OP PERSONAL LIBERTY AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS 
CoRPUS 556-57 (2d ed. 1972); see also id. § V (describing state courts' exercise of jurisdic-
tion over habeas corpus cases to free federal detainees). 
45. The federal courts most often held that "when in a state habeas proceeding it 
became known that the relator was in federal custody, the state court's jurisdiction 
ceases, and all further proceedings in the case will be coram non judice." Ex parte Sif-
ford, 22 F. Cas. 105, 108 (S.D. Ohio 1857). Accord Ex parte Robinson, 20 F. Cas. 965, 968 
(C.C.S.D. Ohio 1856); Ex parte Robinson, 20 F. Cas. 969, 972 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1855); 
Charge to Grand Jury-Fugitive Slave Law, ao F. Cas. 1007, 1010 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1851); 
Norris v. Newton, 18 F. Cas. 322, 325 (C.C.D. Ind. 1850). 
46. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859). 
47. In re Booth, 3 Wis. 13, 17-18 (1854). 
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rately and independently of each other, within their respective 
spheres. And the sphere of action appropriated to the United 
States is as far beyond the reach of the judicial process issued 
by a State judge or State court, as if the line of division was 
traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye. And 
the State of Wisconsin had no more power to authorize these 
proceedings of its judges and courts, than it would have had if 
the prisoner had been confined in Michigan, or in any other 
State of the Union, for an offence against the laws of the State 
in which he was imprisoned. 48 
Further, the Court relied on a pragmatic concern that "a Gov-
ernment ... could [not] have lasted a single year ... if offenses 
against its laws could not have been punished without the con-
sent of the State. "'9 
The Court again considered the issue in Tarble's Case.60 
State courts had read Ableman narrowly as applying only to fed-
eral detainees incarcerated through judicial process.u Tarble in-
volved an enlistee in the army, ordered released by a state court 
judge. The Supreme Court again found federal authority su-
preme, and relied on the potential for disruption of the federal 
government.62 Further, the Court found federal habeas corpus 
proceedings adequate protection against illegal detention.63 Most 
important, in apparent reliance on the supremacy clause, the 
Court grounded its decision on the sovereignty argument: 
"Whenever, therefore, any conflict arises between the enact-
ments of two sovereignties, or in the enforcement of their as-
serted authorities, those of the National government must have 
48. 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 516. 
49. ld. at 515. 
50. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871). 
51. See, e.g. , Ex parte Anderson, 16 Iowa 595, 598 (1864); Ex parte McCarey, 2 
Am. L. Rev. 347 (Me. 1867); In re Shirk, 5 Phila. 333 (Pa. 1863). Contra In re Spangler, 
11 Mich. 298 (1863); State v. Zulich, 29 N.J.L. 409 (1862); In re Hopson, 40 Barb. 34 
(N.Y. 1863); In re Dobbs, 21 How. Pr. 68 (N.Y. 1861); ln re Disinger, 12 Ohio St. 256 
(1861). 
52. "It is evident, as said by this court when the case of Booth was finally brought 
before it, if the power asserted by that State court existed, no offense against the laws of 
the United States could be punished by their own tribunals, without the permission and 
according to the judgment of the courts of the State in which the parties happen to be 
imprisoned .... " Tarble, 80 U.S. at 403. "It is manifest that the powers of the National 
government could not be exercised with energy and efficiency at all times, if its acts 
could be interfered with and controlled for any period by officers or tribunals of another 
sovereignty." ld. at 409. 
53. Id. at 411. 
1983] SUBPOENA POWER 557 
supremacy until the validity of the different enactments and au-
thorities can be finally determined by the tribunals of the 
United States."04 Laid to rest was a narrow interpretation of 
Ableman: federal custody, not undisputed authority established 
by a judicial proceeding, deprives the state court of jurisdiction; 
the lawfulness of the detention is determined by the federal 
courts. 55 
Despite scholarly criticism, Tarble has been widely followed, 
leading one commentator to remark that "it has been conclu-
sively determined that the state courts possess no power ... to 
remove any person from the jurisdiction of the federal officials 
or courts, through the writ of habeas corpus."116 In subsequent 
decisions, the Supreme Court has not repudiated Tarble and 
Ableman.111 
Tarble has been subjected to criticism on various grounds.ll8 
First, Tarble's insistence that the validity of "enactments ... of 
the National government ... [must initially be] determined by 
the tribunals of the United States"&' flies in the face of the rule 
well established even prior to Tarble that state courts are em-
powered to enforce federal law concurrently with federal courts 
so long as Congress did not vest exclusive jurisdiction in the fed-
eral courts.60 State court jurisdiction over cases involving federal 
questions was imperative prior to 1875, when Congress placed 
general federal question jurisdiction in federal courts.81 Further, 
54. ld. at 407. This view of federalism has come under serious criticism. See, e.g., 
Arnold, The Power of State Courts to Enjoin Federal Officers, 73 YALE L.J. 1385 (1964). 
55. Tarble, 80 U.S. at 410. 
56. Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARv. L. REv. 345, 358 
(1930). It appears that Tarble and Ableman are still controlling precedent in federal 
court. See, e.g., Huff v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 564, 568 (W.D. Mo. 1977); Thomas v. 
Levi, 422 F. Supp. 1027, 1033 (E.D. Pa. 1976). C/. Quillar v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 
55, 56 (W.D. Mo. 1967). 
57. See, e.g., Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 261 (1922); Robb v. Connolly, 111 
u.s. 624, 630 (1884). 
58. The criticism of Tarble is generally applicable to the Supreme Court's holding 
in McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821) (state courts may not direct the 
writ of mandamus to a federal official). 
59. 80 U.S. at 407. 
60. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820). See also Charles Dowd Box Co. 
v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 508 n.5 (1962); Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 404 (1959); United 
States v. Bank of New York, 296 U.S. 463, 479,(1936); Galveston, H & S.A. Ry. v. Wal-
lace, 223 U.S. 481, 490-91 (1912); Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884). 
61. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. See C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL 
CouRTS § 1 (4th ed. 1983). 
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as one commentator observed, "[t]he very statute that gives the 
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over state courts assumes 
. . . that state courts have the power to decide federal ques-
tions. "82 The United States Constitution also supports the the-
ory that state courts have jurisdiction over federal questions in 
the very language of the supremacy clause which directs state 
court judges to hold federal law supreme when that law conflicts 
with state law.83 In view of this constitutional language, the en-
actments of Congress, and early Supreme Court decisions, com-
mentators have found cases such as Tarble puzzling at best.64 
Second, Tarble has been criticized because the Court did 
not make clear if the basis for the decision was constitutional or 
implication from congressional inaction.66 This criticism need 
not be discussed in depth because, in either case, Congress 
would have the power to reverse Tarble. Thus, if statutorily 
based, Tarble is "subject to change through explicit congres-
sional action."86 Even if it is a constitutional mandate, the Su-
preme Court affirmed elsewhere the authority of the United 
States to relinquish voluntarily a prisoner within its custody.67 
Inferentially, Congress could grant the states the authority to 
issue writs of habeas corpus to federal officials, thereby permit-
ting a voluntary relinquishment of the detainee. 
B. Mandamus 
Federal courts have also denied state courts the power to 
control federal officials through the use of the writ of manda-
mus. The seminal case is McClung u. Silliman,68 decided by the 
Supreme Court in 1821. In McClung, the plaintiff requested that 
62. Arnold, supra note 54, at 1399. 
63. ld. at 1401-02. 
64. See, e.g., id. at 1405; Note, Limitations on State Judicial Interference with 
Federal Activities, 51 CoLUM. L. REv. 84, 91, 97 (1951). But see M. REDISH, supra note 4, 
at 119 (discussing the impact of the Civil War, the fourteenth amendment, and civil 
righta legislation as evidence of the change in federal -state authority, with an intentional 
move towards stronger federal authority); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) 
(stating that the "legislative history (of 42 U.S.C. § 1983-federal civil rights statute] 
makes evident that Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the relationship be-
tween the States and the Nation with respect to the protection of federally created 
rights"). 
65. M. REDISH, supra note 4, at 120-24. 
66. ld. at 122 n.85. 
67. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 261-63 (1922). 
68. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821). 
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the state court issue a writ of mandamus to the federal land reg-
istrar to force him to issue the plaintiff a deed to a tract of land. 
The state court found that it had jurisdiction over the registrar 
but that the plaintiff was not the owner of the land.611 The 
United States Supreme Court affirmed the result, but held that 
the state court lacked jurisdiction to issue the writ. The land 
registrar's "conduct [could] only be controlled by the power that 
created him. "70 State and federal courts have almost uniformly 
followed McClung in denying state courts the power to issue the 
writ of mandamus.71 Despite some exceptions to the rule,72 there 
is general agreement that McClung has retained its precedential 
value.73 
One factor considered by the court was that at the time that 
McClung was decided, Congress had not granted to the district 
courts the power to issue the writ of mandamus.74 Congress 
vested federal district courts with original mandamus jurisdic-
tion in 1962.711 That grant has raised questions concerning Mc-
Clung's continuing vitality. Perez u. Rhiddlehoouer76 involved a 
suit brought by a district attorney in Louisiana state court 
against federal voting examiners. The district attorney sought to 
prevent the voting examiners from registering parish residents 
who allegedly did not meet the requirements of the state voting 
law. When the state court issued a temporary restraining order 
that blocked registration, the voting examiners removed the case 
to federal district court where the court characterized the action 
as "not a mandamus action, and ... not subject to the infirmi-
69. ld. 
70. ld. at 605. 
71. See, e.g., Wasservogel v. Meyerowitz, 300 N.Y. 125, 89 N.E.2d 712, 716-17 
(1949); Armand Schmoll, Inc. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286 N.Y. 503, 37 N.E.2d 225, 
229-230 (1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S 818 (1942). 
72. "One unexplained exception to [the McClung] line of cases ... is Northern 
Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota ex rel. Langer, 250 U.S. 135, 151-52 (1919)." M. REDISH, supra 
note 4, at 116 n.47. 
73. See, e.g., M. REDISH, supra note 4, at 116. 
74. Mcintire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813), established the doctrine that 
the federal courts could not hear original suits for mandamus but could only issue such 
writs on ancillary motions. In Kendall v. United States ex. rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 
524, 617 (1838), this doctrine was changed to give the Circuit Court for the District of 
Columbia original mandamus jurisdiction, but state court jurisdiction was not addressed. 
See Arnold, supra note 54, at 1392. 
75. Act of Oct. 5, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-748, § l(a), 76 Stat. 744 (codified at 28 
u.s.c. § 1361 (1976)). 
76. 247 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. La. 1965). 
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ties of such an action," but rather as an action "to enjoin the 
federal examiners from registering persons who do not meet the 
requirements of state laws concerned with voter qualifica-
tions. "77 The court then discussed in a note the power of state 
courts to issue writs of mandamus to federal officials and ob-
served that McClung was at least partially based on the reason-
ing that state courts could not exercise power over federal offi-
cials when Congress had not given such power to the federal 
courts. According to the court, "[t]o the extent that McClung 
rests on the [rationale] that the federal courts had not been 
given mandamus jurisdiction, it may now be questionable in the 
light of [the federal law] granting such jurisdiction."78 
If the district court's observation is correct that McClung 
turned on the absence of congressional action, but that a differ-
ent result would be required after Congress granted mandamus 
jurisdiction to the district courts, two conclusions follow. First, 
Tarble and McClung are not required by the Constitution be-
cause a different result would follow from congressional action. 
Second, the district court in Perez suggested that it might infer 
from the 1962 act empowering federal district courts to issue the 
writ of mandamus a similar power to be exercised by state 
courts. That reasoning would make McClung inconsistent with 
Tarble because in Tarble, if understood as a congressional intent 
case, the Supreme Court was unwilling to empower state courts 
absent express congressional action. There it did not follow that 
because a federal district court could have issued the writ of 
habeas corpus a state court could do so as well. In Perez the 
court expressed a willingness to infer state court power from a 
statute silent on the question. The tension between plausible 
readings of Tarble and McClung is further exacerbated when 
one turns to other related precedents. 
C. Other Precedent 
The Supreme Court has decided at least two other cases in 
which state courts have attempted to exercise jurisdiction over 
federal officials. In Boske v. Comingore,19 the state court held a 
United States Collector of Internal Revenue in contempt for re-
77. /d. at 69. 
78. /d. at 69 n.S. 
79. 177 u.s. 459 (1900). 
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fusing to produce copies of official reports. The collector's re-
fusal was based on a Treasury Department regulation which di-
rected that such reports were to be used for revenue collection 
purpose only.80 The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's 
grant of the writ of habeas corpus and held that the detention 
violated the Constitution and the laws of the United States.81 
In Tennessee v. Davis,82 the state attempted to prosecute a 
deputy collector for the Internal Revenue Service who allegedly 
acted in self-defense while engaged in his official duty of seizing 
an illicit distillery. The Supreme Court upheld the constitution-
ality of the federal statute permitting federal officials to remove 
a criminal or civil proceeding to federal courts. 83 The Court 
based its decision both on the practical difficulty created if fed-
eral officials can be interfered with by state authorities and on 
the principles of federalism: 
If, when thus acting, and within the scope of their authority, 
those officers can be arrested and brought to trial in a State 
court for an alleged offense against the law of the State, yet 
warranted by the Federal authority they possess, and if the 
general government is powerless to interfere at once for their 
protection,-if their protection must be left to the action of the 
State court,-the operations of the general government may at 
any time be arrested at the will of one of its members .... 
We do not think such an element of weakness is to be 
found in the Constitution. The United States is a government 
with authority extending over the whole territory of the Union, 
acting upon the States and upon the people of the States. 
While it is limited in the number of its powers, so far as its 
sovereignty extends it is supreme. No State government can 
exclude it from the exercise of any authority conferred upon it 
by the Constitution, obstruct its authorized officers against its 
will, or withhold from it, for a moment, the cognizance of any 
subject which that instrument has committed to it." 
Neither Boske nor Davis, however, should be read as a 
broad denial of state court power over federal officials. In Boske, 
80. !d. at 460. 
81. !d. at 470; see also In re Turner, 119 F. 231 (S.D. Iowa 1902). 
82. 100 u.s. 2S7 (1879). 
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1976). • 
84. 100 U.S. at 263; see also Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276 (1899) (state has no 
constitutional power to interfere with internal administration of a federal institution lo· 
cated within a state's territory). 
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there was a direct conflict between federal and state policies, the 
kind of conflict within the preemption doctrine.85 State court ac-
tion directly impaired the functioning of the federal government. 
Davis merely upheld removal to federal court. By implication, 
therefore, the state court had jurisdiction over the case because 
removal jurisdiction is derivative. 86 Absent invocation of re-
moval, the state court had the power to hear the case. 
D. Injunctions 
The Supreme Court has not decided the question whether 
state courts may enjoin federal officials.87 Among lower courts, 
the general trend is to deny that authority, but there is prece-
dent to the contrary. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. 
McGinnes88 is illustrative of the general trend. In McGinnes, the 
Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission (PTC), a state agency, filed 
suit in federal court to enjoin the Internal Revenue Service from 
paying a tax refund to a taxpayer who had allegedly obtained 
money to pay federal income taxes by fraud on the PTC. After 
the suit was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, it was refiled in 
state court from which it was removed to federal court.8e With 
citations to Tarble and McClung, the district court again dis-
missed for want of jurisdiction because a state court would have 
had no power to issue the injunction.90 The court also cited Owl-
ett, observing that limitations on the power of state legislatures 
paralleled those imposed on state courts. 91 
The result in McGinnes seems to follow logically from Tar-
ble. As one scholar has observed, any "distinction between in-
junction and habeas corpus is difficult to understand."92 How-
ever, the case is not without irony: the theory of parity applies 
85. See J . NowAK, R. RoTUNDA & J. YouNG, supra note 2, at 267. 
86. See, e.g., Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382 
(1922). 
87. M. REDISH, supra note 4, at 117-18. 
88. 179 F. Supp. 578 (E.O. Pa. 1959), aff'd, 278 F.2d 330 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 820 (1960). See also cases cited supra note 40. 
89. 179 F. Supp. at 579-80. 
90. State law was relevant because federal court jurisdiction on removal is deriva-
tive; thus, if the state court was without jurisdiction the federal court derives none. See, 
e.g., Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922); C. 
WRIGHT, supra note 61, § 38, at 150. 
91. 179 F. Supp. at 582. 
92. M. REDISH, supra note 4, at 118. 
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when a case is removed to federal court; the court derives only 
that jurisdiction which the state court had prior to removal. But 
parity would not extend to the state court hearing the case in 
the first instance any authority that a federal court might pos-
sess to enjoin a federal official. 93 
As indicated, not all federal courts have followed the 
trend.84 For example, in Lewis Publishing Co. v. Wyman,8e~ suit 
was brought in state court to enjoin enforcement of an order of 
the Postmaster General. After removal to federal court, the de-
fendants moved to dismiss because the state court lacked juris-
diction to enjoin a postal official. The court rejected that conten-
tion, relying on the premise of fungibility-that absent a 
congressional decision to make jurisdiction exclusive, it is con-
current.88 The court also was unimpressed by the argument that 
such suits would interfere with operation of government: 
It was also contended on behalf of the defense that, in 
view of the fact that actions of this nature are an interference 
with the proper discharge of the duties imposed upon one of 
the executive departments of the national government in pur-
suance of the Constitution, the wheels of the government may 
be stopped by improper injunctions granted by state courts all 
over the country, if permitted. It would be a sufficient answer 
to this contention that there is no reason to presume that the 
courts of the states will pervert the laws of the nation any more 
than would the national courts, and that Congress is of that 
opinion is conclusively evidenced by the fact that it has not 
seen proper to deprive the state courts of that jurisdiction by 
conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of its own crea-
tion in cases of this nature, or even cases arising under the rev-
enue laws. The reports of the Supreme Court of the United 
States are full of cases which were originally instituted against 
collectors of customs and internal revenue in the state courts 
and removed to the national courts, and in none of them has 
that high tribunal ever held that the state court in which the 
93. See, e.g., Monmouth Legal Services Org. v. Carlucci, 330 F. Supp. 985 (D.N.J. 
1971); Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970); Administrative Procedure 
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982) (requiring federal judicial review of actions challenging the 
conduct of federal officers and seeking relief other than monetary damages). 
94. See, e.g., McNally v. Jackson, 7 F.2d 373 (E.D. La. 1925); Underwood v. Dis-
mukes, 266 F. 559 (D.R.I. 1920); City of Stanfield v. Umatilla, 192 F. 596 (C.C.D. Or. 
1911). . 
95. 152 F. 200 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1907). 
96. /d. at 203-04. 
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suit was originally instituted was without jurisdiction." 
Therefore, without reference to Tarble and McClung, the circuit 
court in Wyman affirmed the state court's power to enjoin postal 
officials. 
As will be argued below,98 in addition to being justifiable 
based on the idea of fungibility, Wyman is consistent with cur-
rent views of immunities. Broad immunities are contrary to just 
results. Wyman rejects a broad presumption that state courts 
will pervert federal law and that therefore federal officials must 
always be immune from state court injunctions. By implication, 
Wyman may be read to suggest that a federal official could not 
raise unwarranted interference with the operation of government 
as a defense to the issuance of the state court injunction. 
E. Recognition of State Court Power 
Apart from well-established cases involving habeas corpus 
and mandamus and an uncertain trend involving injunctive pro-
ceedings, there are areas in which state court authority over fed-
eral officials is clear."' Since Teal v. Felton100 was decided in 
1852, it has been established that state courts can award dam-
ages to plaintiffs injured by federal officials.101 In Teal, the Su-
preme Court affirmed a state court judgment in an action for 
trover in which the plaintiff was awarded nominal damages 
caused by a postmaster's refusal to deliver a newspaper to the 
plaintiff. Cases following Teal have distinguished Tarble and 
McClung on the basis of their respective potentials for interfer-
ence with the functioning of the federal government.102 
This rationale breaks down when Supreme Court cases on 
replevin108 and ejectment1~ are examined. The power of state 
97. ld. at 205. 
98. See infra text accompanying notes 111-26. 
99. See Arnold, supra note 54, at 1394. 
100. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284 (1852). 
101. See, e.g., Leroux v. Hudson, 109 U.S. 468 (1883); Sharpe v. Doyle, 102 U.S. 
686, 690 (1881); Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334 (1866); Benchley v. Gilbert, 3 F. 
Cas. 158 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1871); Ex parte Jenkins, 13 F. Cas. 445, 448-50 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 
1853}; Williams v. McDaniel, 80 Ga. App. 614, 56 S.E.2d 926 (1949}. 
102. Professor Redish observes, however, that the impact of state criminal cases 
and damage actions against federal officials "may be very real." M. REDISH, supra note 4, 
at 118 n.65. 
103. Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1 (1817). 
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courts to grant such relief has been upheld even though these 
are "actions in which the judgment may differ only in form from 
an injunction."1011 
State courts may assert jurisdiction over federal officials in 
other contexts. State courts have jurisdiction in criminal actions 
against federal officers.106 The state's jurisdiction is circum-
scribed both by the defendant's right to remove the case to a 
federal court107 and by the power of federal courts to secure the 
prisoner's release by the writ of habeas corpus.108 State courts 
also have jurisdiction over national banks and other federal cor-
porations.108 As one commentator has observed, "Congress . . . 
has commonly assumed that federal corporations and agencies 
will be suable in state courts, once the bar of sovereign immu-
nity-which, unlike the doctrine presently being examined, pre-
vents suit in any court, state or federal- is removed by 
statute. "110 
V. CRITICISM OF LIMITATIONS ON STATE COURTS' POWER 
The law governing state court power to control the actions 
of federal officials is "in confusion. " 111 The lines drawn by the 
Supreme Court-such as those drawn between mandamus and 
replevin or governmental agencies generally and federal 
banks-are inconsistent. There is considerable dispute over 
where such lines ought to be drawn. For example, one commen-
tator observes that "the matter cannot be resolved purely by ref-
erence to authority. An appeal must be made to first principles. 
Only by understanding the place of the state courts in the fed-
104. Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508 (1893). 
105. Arnold, supra note 54, at 1394-95. 
106. See, e.g., United States e.x rel. Drury v. Lewis, 200 U.S. 1 (1906). 
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1976). 
108. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1889). After United States e.x rei. Drury v. Lewis, 
200 U.S. 1 (1906), it is clear that the district court has discretion in its use of the writ: 
"We have repeatedly held that the acts of Congress in relation to habeas corpus do not 
imperatively require the Circuit Courts to wrest petitioners from the custody of state 
officers in advance of trial in the state courts, and that those courts may decline to dis-
charge in the proper exercise of discretion." /d. at 8. 
109. First Nat'! Bank v. Missouri ex rel. Barrett, 263 U.S. 640 (1924). 
110. Arnold, supra note 54, at 1396. The relevant federal statute allowing national 
banks to be sued "in any court of law and equity," 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982), has been 
construed to include state courts. Mercantile. Nat'! Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 
(1963). 
111. Arnold, supra note 54, at 1397. 
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eral system can the question of those courts' power over federal 
officials be properly settled."112 After examining these basic 
principles, most commentators have concluded that state courts 
have the power over federal officials. 11s They rely on the concur-
rent jurisdiction vested in state courts to argue that state courts 
are fungible with federal courts, and, therefore, should have the 
same authority to act. Thus, one writer relied on Alexander 
Hamilton to support the theory of fungibility: 
I mean not therefore to contend that the United States, in the 
course of legislation upon the objects intrusted to their direc-
tion, may not commit the decision of causes arising upon a par-
ticular regulation to the federal courts solely, if such a measure 
should be deemed expedient; but I hold that the State courts 
will be divested of no part of their primitive jurisdiction, fur-
ther than may relate to an appeal; and I am even of opinion 
that in every case in which they were not expressly excluded by 
the future acts of the national legislature, they will of course 
take cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give 
birth . . .. When in addition to this we consider the State gov-
ernments and the national governments, as they truly are, in 
the light of kindred systems, and as parts of ONE WHOLE, 
the inference seems to be conclusive, that the State courts 
would have a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under 
the laws of the Union, where it was not expressly prohibited.114 
That writer concludes that 
[f]or a state court, accordingly, to order a federal official to act 
according to federal law, or to obey valid state law that Con-
gress has not displaced, is no usurpation, nor any assertion that 
state courts are superior to federal courts or federal officials. It 
is rather an assertion of the supremacy of law, and especially of 
federal law.110 
In other words, federal law, not federal courts, is supreme. 
In supporting this view of fungibility, one critic of the Tar-
ble-McClung line of cases dismisses the interference with a gov-
ernment rationale: "[W]hy is not the doctrine of sovereign im-
112. !d. 
113. !d. at 1404-06; cf. Bishop, The Jurisdiction of State and Federal Courts ouer 
Federal Officers, 9 CoLUM. L. REv. 397, 417-18 (1909); Note, supra note 64, at 91. 
114. Arnold, supra note 54, at 1398 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (A. 
Hamilton)). 
115. ld. at 1401. 
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munity, which bars relief against the Government and, in 
circumstances in which the relief prayed will seriously interfere 
with governmental functions, against its officers, a sufficient pro-
tection?"ue Sovereign immunity might also protect officials 
whose duties are targets of writs of habeas corpus or writs of 
mandamus. In addition, goes the argument, federal officials may 
seek removal to federal court in many cases in which they are 
haled into state court.117 Those officials may also seek expedi-
tious habeas corpus relief, even pretrial, if unlawfully incarcer-
ated.118 Further, rather than a blanket prohibition against state 
court action, Congress can grant exclusive jurisdiction over spe-
cific areas in which state interference is real.119 
The foregoing articles suggest that the Tarble-McClung 
view of dual sovereignty is wrong because it does not accord suf-
ficient respect to the state system, and that the interference ra-
tionale is factually inaccurate. Those criticisms apply with equal 
force to state legislatures and to state courts. But additional ar-
guments can be made for allowing state legislatures the sub-
poena power over federal officials. 
VI. THE VIEW FROM THE LEGISLATIVE CHAMBER 
At the inception of this discussion, it was posited that there 
are and will be increasingly wide areas of mutual state and fed-
eral legislative concern. Federal officials will often be in posses-
sion of facts necessary for informed state legislative decisions. 
There is no guarantee that federal officials will voluntarily com-
ply with a request to appear before the state body. 
Although in dictum courts have treated as coterminous the 
immunity of federal officials from appearing before state legisla-
tures and the immunity of federal officials from appearing before 
state courts, 110 that conclusion does not necessarily follow. The 
theoretical criticism of Tarble and McClung undoubtedly ap-
plies with similar force to the legislatures in a federal system. 
116. ld. at 1393. 
117. See, e.g., M. REDISH, supra note 4, at 118 n.65 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) 
(1976)). 
118. Arnold, supra note 54, at 1402. 
119. ld. See also Note, supra note 64, at 94. 
120. See, e.g., United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 751-52 (5th Cir. 1967); Penn-
sylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. McGinnes, 179 F. Supp. 578, 580, 582 (E.D. Pa. 1959); 
United States v. Owlett, 15 F. Supp. 736, 741 (M.D. Pa. 1936). 
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But the pragmatic argument based on interference with the op-
eration of government is even weaker when one considers the 
burden of appearing before a state legislature. Extending sub-
poena power to state courts does not limit the number of sum-
moning parties to the number of state courts, but leaves federal 
officials open to being summoned by myriad private litigants.121 
There are far fewer occasions for state legislatures to summon 
federal officials than there would be for state courts to do so. In 
addition, if a state legislature were granted the right to sub-
poena federal officials, the federal government and its officials 
would not be unprotected from abuse. If a dispute arose as to 
specific questions, a witness could seek an injunction from a fed-
eral court or, if incarcerated for contempt, could petition a fed-
eral court for a writ of habeas corpus. 
The law governing immunities generally has undergone 
change in recent years. The trend is clearly away from blanket 
immunities because they are not favored in the law.122 This 
would seem to be especially true when the federal government 
seeks equitable relief to bar completely the testimony of its em-
ployees. If a legislative inquiry is proper and is not intended to 
harass and does not present an unusual burden on the govern-
ment, there would seem to be no reason for equity to intervene. 
Further, despite broad dicta to the contrary, the case law does 
not support the existence of a complete immunity when a legis-
lature seeks compliance. 
As indicated above, case law on the legislature's power to 
subpoena federal officials is scant. Owlett contains broad Ian-
121. Even if the complete immunity were abrogated, thereby allowing state courts 
to compel attendance of federal officials, it is doubtful t hat the federal government 
would grind to a halt. As indicated, supra note 93, the Administrative Procedure Act 
allows federal courts to enjoin federal officials, apparently without undue hardship. State 
officials may be haled into federal courts, again apparently without paralysis to state 
government. See, e.g., Monnell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (local 
governing body subject to suit under federal civil rights act); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 
167 (1961) (state police officer subject to suit for violation of fourth amendment of 
United States Constitution); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (suit to enjoin state 
officials from enforcing unconstitutional state statute). 
122. See W. PRoSSER, J. WADE & V. ScHWARTZ, ToRTS: CAsEs AND MATERIALS 643-
677 (7th ed. 1982); C. WRIGHT, supra note 61, at 82. Cf. Supreme Court of Virginia v. 
Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980) (Virginia Supreme Court not immune from suit 
when exercising its enforcement powers under the state bar code}; Butz v. Economou, 
438 U.S. 478 (1978) (only qualified immunity for federal officials from civil rights 
actions). 
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guage that "[t]he complete immunity of a federal agency from 
state interference is well established."123 It has been cited for 
that proposition.11' But the actual holdings of Owlett and the 
related McCleod case are far narrower than the cited language 
suggests. 
In Owlett, the district court specifically found that the legis-
lature had no jurisdiction over the area of its proposed in-
quiry.1211 A more narrowly written opinion, fitted to the actual 
holding of Owlett, would have concluded that federal officials 
are immune if federal law has preempted the field and there is 
no room left for state legislation. Or, if the court's concern in 
Owlett were actual harassment, as it was in McCleod, the court 
could properly have granted equitable relief on that basis.128 
If, as argued above, there is no real basis for denying state 
legislatures the power to subpoena federal officials, the only re-
maining consideration is how a state legislature ought to pro-
ceed. State legislatures already have the power to issue subpoe-
nas and conduct investigations, 127 making state legislation 
unnecessary. One possible procedure would be to allow the legis-
lature to subpoena a federal official with information relevant to 
an area appropriate for state legislation. If the official refused to 
comply, the legislature could hold her in contempt, incarcerate 
her, and challenge the validity of the complete immunity when 
she petitions a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus.128 Al-
though this writer believes that the Supreme Court would even-
tually narrow the immunity, for example, to cases involving ac-
tual harassment or inqumes beyond the legislature's 
jurisdiction, there is no guarantee that the Supreme Court would 
resolve that dispute or that, if it did so, the case would be de-
cided expeditiously. Therefore, another method of establishing a 
legislature's subpoena power would be preferable. 
123. United States v. Owlett, 15 F. Supp. 736, 741 (M.D. Pa. 1936). 
124. United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 752 (5th Cir. 1967). 
125. 15 F. Supp. at 740. 
126. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (federal declaratory relief is 
available to a federal plaintiff who demonstrates a genuine threat of enforcement of a 
disputed state criminal statute). 
127. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text. 
128. The question might reach the federal court with less friction, e.g. , if the offi · 
cia! were to seek an injuction as in Owlett, or if one of the parties were to seek a declara· 
tory judgment in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
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As indicated, even in light of Tarble, the Supreme Court 
has upheld the power of the Attorney General to consent to the 
release of a prisoner to state officials.129 That is, the United 
States may consent to appear through its officials. This writer 
recommends that Congress should enact legislation to establish 
the right of a state legislature to subpoena federal officials and 
to issue subpoenas duces tecum for relevant documents, subject 
to limited immunity. Sample legislation follows: 
(A) When an officer or an employee of an executive agency, 
department, or office of the United States is subpoenaed to tes-
tify at a proceeding before a state legislative body, or any com-
mittee, or any subcommittee of such a legislative body, the of-
ficer or employee shall comply with the subpoena. Federal 
officers or employees shall also provide documents, books, re-
cordings, papers, and other materials ordered by state legisla-
tive bodies, committees, or subcommittees. If the official ref-
uses to comply with an order to testify or produce other 
materials and is not exempted from compliance by the provi-
sions of section (B) of this statute, that official is subject to the 
sanctions authorized by the state law for noncompliance with 
its subpoenas. 
(B) Officers and employees of agencies, departments, and of-
fices of the United States may refuse to comply with subpoenas 
or subpoenas duces tecum issued by state legislative bodies, 
committees, or subcommittees only if the official makes an ade-
quate showing before a federal district court that 
(1) the information sought by the state legislature or 
legislative committee or subcommittee does not relate 
to a valid purpose of the state legislature or to a matter 
within the state's power to legislate; or 
(2) the purpose or effect of the order is to impede, ob-
struct, or burden unduly the operation of an agency, 
department, or office of the United States or the per-
formance of an officer's duties as authorized under 
United States law. 
(C) If the official makes an adequate showing under subsection 
(B) (1) or (2), the federal district court shall enjoin the state 
legislative body, committee, or subcommittee either from or-
dering the appearance of the official before the state legislature 
or committee or from requiring the official to respond to spe-
cific questions or requests for documents. If the official has 
129. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922). 
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been incarcerated for contempt of the state legislative body, 
committee, or subcommittee, and if the official makes an ade-
quate showing under subsection (B) (1) or (2), the federal dis-
trict court shall order the state officer in whose custody the 
federal official has been placed to release the federal official.180 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The sample legislation reflects the several arguments made 
in this article. It rejects the broad dicta in Owlett that federal 
officials have a complete immunity from appearing before the 
state legislature. The Supreme Court has never endorsed that 
view. The dicta in Owlett was far broader than the facts of the 
case which involved an instance of obvious abuse by a state leg-
islature hostile to federal law. Further, a complete immunity is 
bad policy in light of the legitimate needs of state lawmakers. 
Section (A) of the sample bill states what this writer be-
lieves ought to be the general rule: that federal officials should 
comply with state process. Further, section (A) provides specifi-
cally that the legislature may use its own sanctions to enforce 
compliance. Although not specifically stated, an official could 
raise defenses available to any other witness appearing before 
the legislature, such as first or fifth amendment objections. 
Section (B) provides for defenses available to the federal of-
ficial in her capacity as a federal official. As discussed above,181 
cases like Owlett and McCleod reflect valid concerns that state 
agencies may act to impede proper exercise of federal authority 
or to unduly burden the operation of the federal government. 
Rather than require the federal official to raise these questions 
defensively in the state compliance proceeding, section (B) al-
lows the federal official to act prospectively to prevent abuse. u 2 
130. In drafting this statute, this writer attempted to balance the need of the legis· 
lature with the interest of comity between federal and state sovereigns. There is no room 
within "Our Federalism" for frequent coercive intrusions into the sphere of the other 
sovereign. Cf. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) (federal courts should not interfere 
with pending state court prosecutions); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (federal 
courts will not enjoin state criminal prosecutions unless there are extraordinary circum-
stances); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976) 
(limitation on federal court jurisdiction to enjoin state proceedings). 
131. See supra text accompanying notes 21·34, 123·26. 
132. Because the power of the federal comt to enjoin the state proceeding would be 
express, it would be a clear exception to the general prohibition against federal injunc-
tions against state court proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2283. 
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It also guarantees a forum- the federal district court- which is 
more likely to be protective of the federal rights involved than 
would be the legislature or state body seeking compliance with 
its own process. Thus, the sample legislation attempts to balance 
competing considerations of federal and state sovereignty, allo-
cating to each its rightful authority. 
